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Under a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, there is an incentive
for system participants to delay making their outgoing payments to facili-
tate their funding, and this creates the risk of settlement delays spreading
throughout the entire system. Intraday credit facility and market practices
have been established to avoid the risk and led to settlement concen-
tration in the morning, as well as concentrations at the speciﬁc times
due to other deferred net settlement (DNS) systems. The heterogeneity
of intraday progress of settlements causes intraday ﬂuctuation in interest
rates. In this paper, we analyze and run simulations on the payment net-
work to understand the intraday ﬂow of funds within Japan’s interbank
money market, especially recycling of the “receipt-driven payments.” We
ﬁnd that (1) the shape of the payment network changes with the time
of day, and payment recycling becomes more likely when the density of
the network is high; (2) patterns of intraday payment ﬂow differ across
the three RTGS systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan, reﬂecting differences in each country’s system for, and underlying
approach to, settlement and funding; and (3) participants comprising the
hub of the payment network function as absorbers of contagion under a
condition sufﬁciently stressful to cause a cascade of settlement delays.
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Interbank money markets, such as Japan’s call money market, used by ﬁnancial insti-
tutions for their ﬁnal funding, exhibit a unique intraday pattern of interest rate ﬂuctua-
tions. Bartolini et al. (2005) reports a clear tendency in the federal funds (FF) market in
the United States, whereby the FF rate is high from the market opening until the early
afternoon, and then gradually declines approaching the market closing. The interest
rates in Japan’s call money markets also tend to be higher in the morning session, and
are likely to decline gradually during the afternoon session (Bank of Japan [2007a]).
These intraday changes in the interest rates can be interpreted as resulting from a mis-
match of intraday transaction needs between borrowers and lenders of funds. It seems
that market participants with a funds surplus are ﬂexible with the timing of making their
outgoing payments, whereas those short of funds are in a hurry in terms of funding
immediately after the market opening to obtain the funds they need for that day.
This behavior in lending/borrowing funds is also strongly inﬂuenced by the under-
lying payment system. For example, the BOJ-NET Funds Transfer System (BOJ-NET),
which handles payments in Japan’s call money market, adopted a deferred net settle-
ment (DNS) system until the end of 2000. Under DNS, in which payments are settled
in batches at designated times during the day, the timing of funding and investments
has some speciﬁc patterns due to the designated times. Hayashi (2001), which analyzes
intradaychangesintheinterestratesunderDNS,ﬁndsastatisticallysigniﬁcantliquidity
effect at the designated times and a declining trend in the interest rate for afternoon half-
day transactionsafter13:00, the timefor theinterimsettlementof netclearingpositions.
Another observation by Saito et al. (2001) is that there was a consistent prediction-
error in the unsecured overnight interest rate over the end of each quarter, caused by the
business practice of concentrating settlement then.
In January 2001, BOJ-NET was converted to a full-ﬂedged real-time gross set-
tlement (RTGS) system, under which individual payments are settled immediately
throughout the day. Under the RTGS system, participants’ strategic behavior aims at
economizing settlement funds, and market practices introduced to prevent such be-
havior have an impact on intraday changes in the interest rates. These factors cause
concentrations of settlements at several timings during the day and increase temporary
demand for settlement funds immediately prior to that, thereby putting upward pressure
on the interest rates.
In this paper, we perform network analysis and simulations using BOJ-NET
payment data, and analyze the intraday ﬂow of funds among participants—intraday
changes in relationship between senders and receivers of funds including both initial
payments and repayments of the call market transactions. An analysis of the micro-
structure of the payment system is of value in an ex ante examination of the conta-
gion of settlement delays under stress conditions. It is also useful for investigating
the function and role that should be played by participants and facilities introduced
in conjunction with RTGS in the system-wide contagion triggered by “receipt-driven
payments.” This should provide a clue to examine the impact on the pricing of the
interest rates, particularly the overnight call rate, during the day.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes differences between the
two primary types of settlement modes, DNS and RTGS, and provides an overview
of the literature on the settlement behavior of participants in an RTGS system. Sec-
tion III compares BOJ-NET with the RTGS systems of the United States and the
United Kingdom to shed light on BOJ-NET’s systemic characteristics. From a net-
work perspective, Section IV examines BOJ-NET’s payment network in the morning
and afternoon, respectively, to conﬁrm how the network’s shape is affected by non-
time-homogeneous settlement behavior. Section V uses the fundamental information
collected in the previous section to simulate a liquidity-shock contagion. This allows an
experimental examination of the impact on intraday ﬂow of funds if there is a change
in settlement behavior. We end with our conclusion in Section VI.
II. Settlement Behavior
A. Shift from DNS to RTGS
The payment systems operated by central banks in advanced economies used to adopt
DNS, in which payments are settled on a net basis in a manner of batch. DNS can
minimize the total funds needed to settle a given amount of payments and is therefore
the most efﬁcient settlement mode. On the other hand, it provides no settlement ﬁnality
until predetermined settlement times. Because all transactions are unsettled until those
times and remain revocable and conditional,
1 the exposure, which is indicated as the
product of settlement value and its duration, mounts during the day, and thus creates a
risk management problem. As central banks have become more aware of the issue of
settlement risk since the late 1980s, they have begun to shift from DNS to RTGS in
their payment systems to avoid the accumulation of intraday settlement exposure.
Under RTGS, payments are settled on a transaction-by-transaction basis immedi-
ately after they are accepted in the payment system. This makes it possible to achieve
settlement ﬁnality continuously throughout the day depending on the timing of submis-
sion of the payment instruction. Under DNS, if only a single participant fails to settle
its net position, all settlements of other participants involved in the netting calculation
are forced to be unwound. Under RTGS, in contrast, the only the counterparties for the
defaulting participant are directly affected. However, if a participant plans to use an
incoming payment to fund its outgoing payment, such settlement behavior of one par-
ticipant can have an indirect impact on that of other participants. It is this characteristic
that we refer to as payment recycling under RTGS. For example, if an incoming pay-
ment from a counterparty comes in promptly, the funds can be used to promptly make
an outgoing payment. If the incoming payment does not come in promptly, however,
the outgoing payment will be delayed until it comes, barring resort to other funding
sources including the existing account balance.
1. This means there is still a possibility left of revoking or unwinding a status for which settlement has been ﬁnal.
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B. Theoretical Research on RTGS
In step with the rapid adoption of RTGS mode, there has been a substantial body of the-
oretical and empirical literature written, primarily by central bank staff, on settlement
behavior under RTGS.
The mainstream thought on the theoretical side, such as by Kobayakawa (1997),
Angelini (1998), Roberds (1999), and Bech and Garratt (2003), uses game theory anal-
ysis on participants’ strategic behavior.
2 Although the terminology differs depending
on the model, all of these papers construct a theoretical model that assumes partici-
pants make payments subject to the trade-off between their funding cost and settle-
ment delay cost, while simultaneously taking account of the settlement behavior of
their counterparties. Because the need for additional funding declines as the number of
opportunities to receive payments from counterparties increases, these models assume
that the funding cost is a decreasing function of time, while the settlement delay cost,
representing here a loss of conﬁdence from counterparties when settlement is late, is
an increasing function of time. Participants are assumed to time their outgoing pay-
ments so as to minimize their own settlement costs, the total of these two costs, with
respect to time.
When there is an opportunity to save on settlement costs by making payments late,
participants have an incentive to delay their own outgoing payments.
3 For example,
assume that Banks X and Y each have one same-value outgoing payment instruction
to another. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix in a simultaneous-move game between
the two banks. Each bank has a choice of strategies: making a payment either in the
ﬁrst period (move early) or in the second period (move late). If both banks choose to
move early, they each only bear the funding cost,
￿ (
 
￿). If both choose to move late,
they must bear the settlement delay cost,
￿ (
 
￿), in addition to the funding cost. If
one bank moves early and the other bank moves late, the early-moving bank bears the
funding cost in the ﬁrst period as well as the opportunity cost of settlement funds,
￿,i n
the second period. Because the late-moving bank can recycle the funds received from
the early-moving bank in the ﬁrst period to make its outgoing payment, it only bears
the settlement delay cost. When
￿
 
￿, the opportunity to reduce settlement costs by
moving late creates an incentive to pursue the move-late strategy.
2. For an overview of settlement games under RTGS, see Imakubo (2005).
3. Because the settlement time under DNS is predetermined, participants do not have an alternative strategy except
settlements at that time. Strictly speaking, they could also pursue a strategy of purposefully not making a
payment, that is, strategic defaults. It is not a realistic strategy, however, especially in a repeated game because
of the large penalty that would incur.
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Following McAndrews and Potter (2002), we can simplify participant
￿’s reaction
function, derived from the minimization problem of settlement costs, that determines

































The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of the equation (1) is the receipt-independent
payment that does not rely on incoming payments from counterparties, and IB
￿ is
funded either by the banks’ own balances at central bank accounts or by the intraday
credit facility offered by the central bank. The second term on the right-hand side rep-






￿, reserved funds of incoming payments
from counterparties at the time
￿
￿
￿. The development in the funds is affected by the




￿ depend on the




￿ becoming smaller as both the
costs increase.
This strategic settlement behavior of one participant recycles payments and then
sequentially affects the settlement behavior of other participants. Once a participant
makes a payment, a receiver of the payment makes a receipt-driven payment, and then
a subsequent receiver of the payment makes another receipt-driven payment, with in-
coming and outgoing payments occurring sequentially. If
 
￿ is large enough, payments
are recycled one after another through receipt-driven payments. As long as these funds
circulate efﬁciently among participants, smooth ﬂow of payments is achieved in the
entire system while each participant does its best to hold down its additional funding
cost. This is a positive aspect of payment recycling.
There is also a negative aspect, however. RTGS, under which each payment is
settled on a transaction-by-transaction basis, is basically a sender-driven system, that
is, the timing of settlement is determined by senders of payments.
4 Participants with a
strong incentive to hold down their funding cost are likely to attempt to delay mak-
ing payments so that they can fund them with incoming payments. This increases
uncertainty of the timing of receipts for the receiver side. McAndrews (2006) refers
to this uncertainty as timing friction. RTGS itself does not have any mechanism to
eliminate the moral hazard deriving from excessive dependence on incoming payments
to secure funds, as well as the intentional restriction on receipt-independent payments
to save funding cost. Consequently, if the funding environment becomes tight or the
opportunity cost of securing funds in advance becomes high, and one participant slows
its pace of settlement as a way to save its funding cost, the ﬁrst-round effect will be de-
lays in both receipt-independent and receipt-driven payments. This would be followed
by the second-round effect in which participants expecting to receive the payments
would reduce their own receipt-driven payments. When these second-round effects
become persistent and spread among participants one after another, they can result in
system-wide gridlock.
5 The transmission mechanism of second-round effects caused
by payment recycling will depend on the value of payments and which participants
4. As in the case of a direct debit contrary to sender-driven payment, settlement can be initiated by the receiver
instead of the sender.
5. This refers to a situation in which there are enough funds available to settle net positions of unsettled payments,
but not enough funds available to settle their gross positions.
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Of these two, the former set of relationships can be dealt with in a concept of payment
network, wherein the ﬂow of funds is described using the vector information of direc-
tion and value. The latter factor can also be expressed in terms of network structure if
the scheduled order is added to the vector information.
The positive and negative aspects of payment recycling are really two sides of the
same coin. The side of the coin that appears depends on the participants’ incentives.
Payment recycling thus creates a very strong interconnectedness among participants,
that is, externality, and leads to strategy-dependency among participants’ settlement
behavior. Consequently, it affects the timing of settlements, which depends on their
incentive to settle with and without settlement delay.
C. Empirical Research on RTGS
There are also empirical studies that analyze settlement activity from the perspective of
payment recycling. The literature on a statistical examination of the intraday distribu-
tion of payment value and volume includes McAndrews and Rajan (2000), McAndrews
and Potter (2002), and Lacker (2004), all of which look at the Fedwire funds transfer
system in the United States, and James (2003), which looks at the Clearinghouse Auto-
mated Payment System (CHAPS) in the United Kingdom. The results of these papers
support the theoretical argument that when funding cost is high relative to settlement
delay cost, the pace of settlement is reduced because each participant delays making its
outgoing payments. The literature also notes the presence of spontaneous cooperative
action to concentrate settlement at around exogenous settlement events so as to mini-
mize funding cost. In the case of BOJ-NET, the concentration of settlement is observed
at around the scheduled time of settlements of clearing balances for ancillary systems
such as the Zengin System, which handles domestic retail credit transfers.
A different empirical approach is to combine network analysis with simulation
analysis. Network analysis views the participants as nodes and the interconnectedness
between these senders and receivers of payments as links, statically analyzing the pay-
ment recycling among them. In contrast, simulation analysis generates a sequence of
settlements as a result of participants’ decisions on when and how much they fund
subject to funding liquidity constraints such as their position limits and the timing ac-
cording to which they proceed with their payments under the predetermined payment
framework. This allows for a dynamic assessment of payment recycling.
The network approach has become possible with the emergence of social network
analysis techniques, the wider use of software, and the settlement simulators developed
by central banks. Examples of social network analysis include introductory texts by
Barabási(2002)andWatts(2003),andasoftware-baseddescriptionbyDeNooy,Mrvar,
and Batagelj (2005). Examples of simulators include the Bank of Finland Payment
System Simulator, an overview of which is given by Koponen and Soramäki (2005).
Empirical research using network analysis includes Inaoka et al. (2004), which
looks at the characteristics of the payment network using BOJ-NET’s settlement log;
Imakubo and Soejima (2010), which analyzes the interbank funding network by ex-
tracting call money transactions from the same settlement log; Soramäki et al. (2006),
which analyzes the payment network using the U.S. Fedwire settlement log; Iori
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et al. (2007), which is an analysis of the funding network using the transaction log
for Italy’s interbank electronic broking system; and Müller (2006), an examination of
large-value bilateral exposures among Swiss ﬁnancial institutions.
6 Empirical research
that uses a settlement simulator includes Schmitz et al. (2006), a study of the Aus-
trian Real Time Interbank Settlement System (ARTIS); Bedford, Millard, and Yang
(2004), an examination of the U.K. CHAPS; and Beyeler et al. (2006), which uses
hypothetical data.
7
Payment data are not ordinarily disclosed because of their conﬁdential nature.
Consequently, most empirical research using either approach has thus far been done
by analysts who work for organizations that operate payment systems.
III. International Comparison of RTGS Systems
Unless speciﬁc measures are taken under RTGS, there is a risk of system-wide set-
tlement delays and social welfare inefﬁciencies due to the incentive to delay making
payments. At the extreme, it is conceivable that no payment would be completed
during the day, but rather that all payments would be concentrated immediately prior
to the system closing. In fact, as explained later, in some countries the settlement is
concentrated in the evening. Normally, a variety of precautionary measures are taken
in both direct and indirect manners to prevent such a potential problem in RTGS sys-
tems. These measures can make RTGS systems effectively more stable. In this section,
we compare Japan’s BOJ-NET with U.S. Fedwire and U.K. CHAPS,
8 examine the
mechanisms built in BOJ-NET RTGS, and consider how well these mechanisms have
functioned. Fedwire, the RTGS system operated by the U.S. Federal Reserve, handles
the settlement of transactions denominated in U.S. dollars. CHAPS, the RTGS system
jointly operated by the Bank of England (BOE) and a private-sector institution, handles
the settlement of transactions denominated in pounds sterling. The international com-
parison is conducted by focusing on ﬁve factors: (1) reserve requirements that ensure
settlement funds ex ante; (2) an intraday credit facility provided by a central bank to
cover temporary liquidity shortages during the day; (3) market practices that clearly
specify the timing of settlement; (4) the funds turnover ratio, which is the ratio of a total
payment value to settlement funds balances; and (5) the intraday settlement activity that
reﬂects these factors.
A. Reserve Requirements and Intraday Credit Facility
Access to settlement funds under an RTGS system is given by the reserve requirement,
which is one of the frameworks for money market operations, and the intraday credit
facility, which is speciﬁc to an RTGS system (Table 2). Current account balances under
the reserve requirement can be directly used as settlement funds. The demand for set-
tlement funds by ﬁnancial institutions varies day by day, but the reserve requirements
are designed to stabilize reserve balances at the central bank.
6. For a survey of the literature, see Imakubo and Soejima (2010).
7. See Leinonen and Soramäki (2004) for an overview of settlement simulation analysis.
8. See Bank for International Settlements (2005) for details of the basic design of both systems.
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Fedwire CHAPS BOJ-NET
Reserve requirements Yes No Yes






Form of credit Unsecured overdrafts Intraday repos Secured overdrafts
Limits of credit Yes No No
Fee Charged Not charged Not charged
While the reserve requirements have been established by law in the United States
and Japan, other requirements of current account reserves with a central bank in the
United States and the United Kingdom are made on a contractual basis, referred to as
the clearing balances and the reserve averaging scheme, respectively. In addition, the
cash ratio deposits held at the BOE by depository institutions can also be used dur-
ing the day as settlement funds in the United Kingdom. A number of these accounts
pay interest, which helps to lower the opportunity cost of maintaining current account
balances at a central bank. For example, in the United Kingdom, interest is paid on the
amount up to the required reserves under the reserve averaging scheme. In the United
States, interest is also paid on the clearing balances in the form of points that can be
used to pay various fees incurred under the Federal Reserve System.
9
Direct participants in Fedwire and CHAPS are in principle subject to reserve
controls, but many BOJ-NET participants are not subject to the reserve requirement,
namely, private-sector non-depository institutions that are able to settle directly within
BOJ-NET. These institutions are expected to keep current account balances and/or
maintain collateral for intraday overdrafts.
All three RTGS systems have intraday credit facilities. Common to all three is a
requirement to make repayments before the system closing on that day and a mech-
anism to complement the market’s function to allocate any intraday fund imbalance
caused by institutional reasons. The speciﬁcs of these facilities vary by central bank,
however. Both Fedwire and BOJ-NET take the form of overdrafts, and CHAPS uses
intraday repos.
10 Users of intraday credit under CHAPS and BOJ-NET, which are
predicated on secured transactions, are subject to collateral restrictions.
11
Reserve requirements and intraday credit facilities provide a source of funds for
receipt-independent payments. Accordingly, the lower the cost of funding from these
sources, the greater the contribution of receipt-independent payments to payments
9. In October 2008, central banks changed their deposit facilities in response to the market turmoil. The BOE
replaced the existing Standing Lending Facility with a new Operational Standing Lending Facility. The Fed
began to pay interest on required and excess reserve balances. The BOJ introduced the complementary deposit
facility as a temporary measure, under which it pays interest on excess reserve balances.
10. See Zhou (2000) for a detailed survey of the literature on forms of intraday credit.
11. BOJ-NET offers no speciﬁc measures for re-hypothecation of collateral assets, but CHAPS allows for reuse of
liquid assets posted under the stock liquidity regime to fund via the intraday repo facility.
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Table 3 Market Practices
Fedwire CHAPS BOJ-NET
Minimum balance No No No
Early settlement No Throughput guidelines One-hour rule
Repayment-ﬁrst rule
Gridlock countermeasures No Circle operations
Position limits
No
Liquidity sink countermeasures No SBLS No
overall, which contributes to receipt-driven payments and accelerates payments as a
whole. Realistically, however, either not all payment system participants have access to
these funds, as is the case in Japan’s reserve requirements, or it is not always possible
for participants to time their use of intraday credit as they please, because some partic-
ipants may face collateral restrictions, as with the intraday credit facilities in both the
United Kingdom and Japan. In this case, participants must either depend on incoming
payments or procure new funds in the market, and the latter option would put upward
pressure on interest rates during the day.
In one respect, unsecured intraday call money transactions in Japan marginally
ease the upward pressure on the unsecured overnight call rate. The intraday money
market works through the function of tanshi companies (money market brokers), which
play the role as both the money center and the center of information on the intraday
imbalance among money markets. Speciﬁcally, a lender provides its intraday surplus
funds to the brokers, which then allocate the funds to a borrower through their dealing
account. If the lender and the borrower of funds do not agree on the desired transaction
timing in terms of the start and the end, the brokers repay the lender of funds on behalf
of the borrower and temporarily bridge the gap, thereby overcoming this mismatch of
trading timing. Intraday call money transactions provide an important source of liquid-
ity for participants who do not have sufﬁcient collateral but tend to have a large amount
of intraday multilateral net debit positions.
B. Market Practices
We look next at the market practices associated with RTGS systems (Table 3).
While no rules have been introduced regarding minimum balances of settlement
funds, the RTGS systems in Japan and the United Kingdom do have a number of rules
aimed at preventing participants from delaying settlement. The throughput guidelines
for CHAPS require completion of 50 percent of a day’s settlement by noon and 75 per-
cent by 14:30.
12 CHAPS has also introduced measures to prevent and solve gridlock.
The position limits are set bilaterally between counterparties so that their intraday
bilateral net positions are not overly biased, which mitigates the risk of gridlock. The
circle operation initiates multilateral netting if gridlock does occur. In addition, CHAPS
has the Stricken Bank Liquidity Scheme (SBLS) to deal with liquidity sinks, which
occur when a hoarding of funds by certain participants momentarily reduces liquidity
12. Buckle and Campbell (2003) carry out a theoretical analysis of the impact of the throughput guidelines on
participants’ strategic settlement behavior.
159Table 4 Funds Turnover Ratios
Daily averages, US$ billions
Fedwire CHAPS BOJ-NET
Current account balances 17.5 5.8 213.1
(
￿) (—) (3.4) (25.1)
Intraday credit 116.5 24.6 136.3
(
￿) (—) (13.6) (16.2)
Settlement value 2,074.2 377.2 785.8
(







￿ 15 12 2
￿
￿
￿ 119 65 4
￿
￿
￿ 18 15 6
Notes: 1. Figures as of December 2006.
2. Figures in parentheses are denominated in local
currency. CHAPS is in units of billions of pounds, and
BOJ-NET in units of trillions of yen.
Source: Bank for International Settlements (2008).
available within the system. Under SBLS, a participant that for whatever reason is
temporarily unable to make a payment has its incoming payments suspended. This is
one mechanism aimed at keeping settlement on track under unusual conditions.
Under BOJ-NET, the timing of most settlement is controlled through the one-hour
rule, which encourages lenders in a same-day-start transaction to release their funds
within one hour after the contract, and through the repayment-ﬁrst rule, which encour-
ages borrowers to make repayments immediately after 9:00 (the opening time of BOJ-
NET) and no later than 10:00. By establishing clear-cut time limits, it appears that both
rules go beyond simply alleviating the uncertainty associated with the timing of receipts
and actually help to prevent gridlock to some extent. These market practices result in
both the repayments and the initial payments contracted in that morning being concen-
trated from 9:00 to 10:00. During this time period of concentrated funds ﬂow, there is
a large level of market funding activity, particularly for the settlement of repayments,
and this puts upward pressure on interest rates.
Without any rules regarding the timing of settlement, there would be no way for
participants in an RTGS system to gain ex ante knowledge of when on the settlement
day the counterparty will execute payments. Consequently, the more dependent a par-
ticipant is on receipt-driven payments, the more easily it is affected by uncertainty over
settlement timing. If market practices share the information on settlement timing and
participants can easily forecast and conﬁrm their own intraday funds balances, they
should be able to efﬁciently use incoming payments to fund their outgoing payments
and minimize the impact from such timing uncertainty.
C. Funds Turnover Ratio and Settlement Activity
Table 4 shows a comparison of the funds turnover ratios that are achieved under the
systems and rules described above. The funds turnover ratio is the ratio of the total value
settledtotheamountofsystemliquidity,andisasimplemeasureoftheefﬁciencyofthat
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liquidity. Note, however, that it measures the efﬁciency of the entire system’s liquidity,
and provides no indication of the efﬁciency of each participant’s funding liquidity.
The turnover ratio for the sum of current account balances and intraday credit is
generally highest at Fedwire, followed by CHAPS and then BOJ-NET. Interest rate
levels, which are critical to measuring opportunity cost, vary by country, making a
simple comparison of turnover ratios difﬁcult. A look at BOJ-NET’s overall settlement
environment including its related facilities shows that it requires a greater amount
of liquidity for a given settlement value than the other systems. From the opposite
standpoint, BOJ-NET seems to be more robust to liquidity shocks, and therefore the
upward pressure on interest rates caused by liquidity shocks should be relatively lower
within BOJ-NET.
Both CHAPS and BOJ-NET are designed so that intraday credit can be received
for an amount greater than that needed for settlement, and thus there are constantly
a number of participants receiving greater intraday credit than their settlement needs.
At BOJ-NET, for example, to simplify operations for settlement during the course of
the day, it is possible for participants to obtain an intraday overdraft from the system
opening, by pledging Japanese government securities (JGSs) as collateral not other-
wise planned for use that day, through the simultaneous processing of delivery-versus-
payment and collateralization facility (SPDC).
13 This explains why the amount of
intraday credit drawn under both CHAPS and BOJ-NET tends to be higher than the
total value settled. This is not observed for intraday overdrafts in Fedwire, which in
principle incur a fee. Instead, any Fedwire overdraft repaid within one minute is not
counted nor charged the overdraft fee. This creates an incentive to take advantage of
super short-term, one minute or less, overdrafts, and thus, as explained below, during
speciﬁc time periods there are numerous very short-term overdrafts repeatedly used at
a high frequency (McAndrews and Rajan [2000]).
Figure 1 shows that differences in facilities and rules among the three systems re-
sult in different settlement progress, measured by the intraday cumulative distribution
of settlement value. Fedwire does not have any rules regarding the timing of settle-
ment, and this creates a strong incentive to delay making payments. Consequently, the
intraday cumulative distribution shows a sharp increase immediately before the end of
the system’s operating hours, which run from 21:00 on the previous day until 18:30
on the day.
14 Since the 1990s, settlements have become increasingly delayed, and thus
concentrated more heavily toward the system closing. Under these extreme conditions,
there is a risk that system operational problems or other emergencies will prevent all
settlements from being completed during the day, and the monetary authority also
sees this as an issue (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [2006]). The
concentration of payments ﬂow, however, does not necessarily lead directly to upward
13. The SPDC facility refers to the simultaneous processing of JGS delivery and its payment. It allows a receiver
of JGSs to pledge the incoming securities as collateral for intraday overdrafts from the BOJ, while using the
overdrafts to pay for those incoming securities (likewise in the opposite direction).
14. For securities settlement at the Depository Trust Company (DTC) and payment settlement at the Clearing
House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS), a certain amount of funds is locked up during the day in dedicated
accounts. The momentary decline in usable funds over Fedwire until these settlements are completed has been
identiﬁed as one reason why Fedwire settlements are concentrated in the period just before the system closing.
For details, see McAndrews and Rajan (2000).
161Figure 1 Intraday Settlement Activity
Note: Horizontal axis shows local time, and vertical axis shows the rate of cumulative
value settled.
Sources:Federal Reserve; Bank of England; Bank of Japan.
pressure on interest rates, unlike the other RTGS systems. Because intraday overdrafts
repaid within a minute are not recorded, Fedwire could be viewed as having the same
economic impact as an RTGS system with an offsetting mechanism.
15
In contrast, for interbank funds transfers under BOJ-NET, a large amount of set-
tlement is completed immediately after the system opening at 9:00 because of the
repayment-ﬁrst rule, and then the rest of settlement proceeds in order according to
the one-hour rule, resulting in a decreasing pace of settlement approaching the system
closing at 17:00. Consequently, the cumulative distribution of value settled in BOJ-
NET has a shape symmetrical to that of Fedwire. The rapid progress in settlement
means minimizing intraday exposure of settlement. Settlements on CHAPS occur at
a fairly even pace throughout the business day, from the system opening at 6:00 to the
system closing at 16:20, and thus the ﬁgure is fairly linear. The timing of settlement for
each participant under the throughput guidelines determines the pace of settlement for
the overall system.
15. The offsetting mechanism searches for a set of payment instructions that may not be settled one by one because
of insufﬁcient balances but can be settled when taking into account incoming payments from counterparties
as a source of liquidity. It then settles the selected set of payment instructions simultaneously. For details, see
Imakubo (2005).
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IV. Payment Network
In this section, we show that the pace of settlement under BOJ-NET varies during the
course of the day, and we express this as a change in the shape of the payment network.
Unless speciﬁcally stated otherwise, our analysis focuses only on interbank funds trans-
fers (primarily the settlement of call loans), a subset of BOJ-NET funds transfers. For
more on the relationship between the interbank funds transfers and overall BOJ-NET
funds transfers, see the Appendix.
The content of interbank funds transfers changes throughout the day according to
the type of transactions and the relationship between counterparties. These transactions
include the repayment of call loans made until the day prior, the short-term investment
by investment trusts in response to ﬂuctuations in their cash positions, the supply of
intraday surplus funds in the intraday call market, and the supply of banks’ overnight
surplus funds after they conﬁrm their net positions for that day’s domestic retail credit
transfers in the ancillary DNS system. Consequently, the pairings of senders and re-
ceivers of funds, as well as the settlement value and volume, vary greatly depending on
the time of day.
The distribution of settlement value for the interbank funds transfers every 10 min-
utes is shown in Figure 2. In the morning, roughly half of the value settled in a single
dayiscompletedduringtheonehourstartingat9:00becauseoftherepayment-ﬁrstrule,
the concentration of call money transactions for that day’s funding in the early hours,
and the early settlement of those transactions subject to the one-hour rule. Settlements
Figure 2 Intraday Settlement Activity
Note: Daily average value of interbank funds transfers settled in December 2006.
Source: Bank of Japan.
163Figure 3 Distribution of the Degree (Number of Nodes Linked)
Note: Daily average of interbank funds transfers settled in December 2006 for transactions
valued at ¥10 million or higher.
Source: Bank of Japan.
from 10:00, in contrast, are primarily of transactions for adjustments of cash positions.
Speciﬁcally, the settlements of net positions for some clearing systems occur one after
another: the bill and check clearing system at 12:30, the foreign exchange yen clearing
system at 14:30, and the domestic retail credit transfers at 16:15. The distribution across
time, therefore, shows a tendency for settlement value to reach local peaks immediately
after those clearing settlements. These intraday changes can be viewed as changes
in the shape of the payment network. Although the network shape changes through-
out the day, for simplicity we compare network shapes for just two periods, morning
and afternoon.
Network analysis investigates nodes and their links. The number of nodes to which
a node links is called its degree, and their quantitative information is called the strength
of these links. Within a payment network, the participants are the nodes, the outgoing-
incoming pairing of payments is the link, the number of counterparties a participant
links to is the degree, and the value and volume of settlements in a link corresponds to
the strength of the link.
16
Figure 3 shows a distribution of the degree, that is, the number of counterparties
with which a participant settled interbank funds transfers. In both the morning and
the afternoon, the most common level of degree is one, but the number of nodes with
16. In addition to the statistics dealt with in this paper, there are various statistics such as the distance between two
nodes, the inﬂuence domain that measures the range possibly affected, and the core and cluster coefﬁcients that
measure the network density. See Imakubo and Soejima (2010) for deﬁnitions of these statistics.
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the degree of zero is rather limited even for low-degree nodes (the zero degree is not
s h o w ni nt h eﬁgure). There are very few high-degree nodes. This sort of long-tailed
distribution is observed in many types of networks, and often follows a power law
distribution.
17 Imakubo and Soejima (2010), a study of Japan’s call money transaction
network, ﬁnd these high-degree nodes that have functioned as the hub for the entire
network, consisting of money brokers, city banks, asset management trusts, central
ﬁnancing organizations for ﬁnancial cooperatives, major securities ﬁrms, trust banks,
and major regional banks. They also suggest that the hub institutions are very densely
linked to each other as in a complete network.
Imakubo and Soejima (2010) look only at the network’s average structure over a
speciﬁc month, without respect to changes throughout a day. As noted above, because
the settlement pace is not homogenous, there are substantial differences in both concen-
tration and distribution of the degree depending on the time of day. Figure 3 shows that
the degree in the morning is higher than in the afternoon. This indicates that the network
has greater link density in the morning, and clearly reﬂects that funding transactions
are concentrated in the morning, and a smaller value of transactions for adjustments
of cash positions are settled in the afternoon. For low-degree participants, however,
there is virtually no difference between the morning and the afternoon. The majority
of these participants have only a few links in both the morning and the afternoon and
are likely to settle with the same counterparties such as money brokers. On the other
hand, in the morning there are participants with the high degree of more than 40, but
not in the afternoon. In addition, the number of participants with the degree of at least
10 decreases from 50 in the morning to only 15 in the afternoon. This indicates that as
the network becomes sparser in the afternoon, the number of participants functioning as
the hub declines, and the number of nodes linked with the hub institutions also declines.
The high-degree participants in the morning are primarily money brokers, city banks,
trust banks, asset management trusts, major securities ﬁrms, central ﬁnancing organiza-
tions for ﬁnancial cooperatives, and major regional banks. In the afternoon, the degree
declines as a whole, especially among major securities ﬁrms. This is attributed to two
factors: the banks handling the foreign exchange yen transactions and domestic retail
credit transfers still have a larger number of nodes linked in the afternoon owing to the
adjustments for cash position; contrarily, the major securities ﬁrms largely complete
their settlement including securities settlement during the morning.
Figure 4 plots in a scatter diagram the volume of outgoing and incoming payments
for each node in the morning and the afternoon. The volume of payments indicates
the strength of links with other nodes. In the morning, the majority of nodes have a
distribution approaching a 45-degree line, implying roughly an equal frequency of out-
going and incoming payments.Thisisattributed toaconcentration ofrollover payments
caused by the repayment-ﬁrst rule. The large number of nodes in the upper right area
of the diagram indicates a considerable ﬂow of payments to/from the participants. The
subset of the nodes with a large payment volume largely equates with the subset of the
17. When following a power law distribution, the probability of node



















For a simple explanation of how power law distributions relate to a network, see Barabási (2002) and
Watts (2003).
165Figure 4 Payment Frequency per Node
Note: Daily average of interbank funds transfers settled in December 2006 for transactions
valued at ¥10 million or higher. Both axes are on a logarithmic scale.
Source: Bank of Japan.
hub institutions described above, namely, the institutions that make frequent payments
with multiple counterparties. Under RTGS, hub institutions serve as intermediaries that
facilitate the ﬂow of funds, but can suddenly have an adverse impact on a wide range of
payments if they fall behind in making their payments.
In the afternoon, the distribution is weighted toward the lower left area, indicating
that the majority of nodes have fewer than 10 outgoing/incoming payments, and there
is a decline in not only the link density of the network but also the overall volume
of payments. Unlike in the morning, payments are only made between limited node
pairs, and there is substantial deviation from the 45-degree line, implying that many
nodes are weighted toward either outgoing or incoming payments. As opposed to the
morning when the concentration of that day’s funding transactions including rollovers
occurs immediately after the system opening, the transactions for position adjust-
ments in the afternoon are mostly made up of either additional funding or investment.
This explains the decline in payment volume and the dispersion toward outgoing or
incoming payments.
Lastly, we look at the distribution of interbank funds transfers by value. In a pay-
mentnetwork,thesigniﬁcanceofanyonelinkvariesdepending onwhetheritrepresents
a payment value of ¥10 million or ¥10 billion. Payment value, like payment volume,
contains critical information on the strength of a link. Figure 5 shows that in both the
morning and the afternoon, payments in nice round numbers (such as ¥10 million or
¥10 billion) are the most frequent. As shown by Brown, Laux, and Schachter (1991),
business practices tend to result in most transactions becoming speciﬁc sizes in order
to minimize transaction costs between counterparties and increase the speed of contract
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Figure 5 Distribution of Interbank Funds Transfers by Value
Note: The daily average value of interbank funds transfers settled in December 2006 for
transactions valued at ¥10 million or higher.
Source: Bank of Japan.
execution. In the morning, payments with a value of either ¥10 million or ¥10 billion
are overwhelmingly the most frequent. Because secured call money transactions are
most frequently valued at ¥10 million and unsecured transactions at ¥10 billion in the
morning, the respective distribution peaks are indicative of the types of transactions. In
the afternoon, there are still a fairly large number of unsecured call money transactions
valued at ¥10 billion, whereas the volume of payments corresponding to secured trans-
actions is low. This is because the position adjustments in the afternoon are based more
on unsecured call money transactions than on secured transactions.
As seen above, the links between nodes are stronger in the morning, whether meas-
ured in degree, value, and volume of payments. In other words, the payment network
is more densely linked, and each link’s strength is on average higher in terms of both
value and volume, during the morning. This is attributed to a greater extent of payment
recycling in the morning owing to the market practices and intraday credit facility in-
troduced with the conversion to full-ﬂedged RTGS. Greater payment recycling makes
funding liquidity more efﬁcient, but also may increase the possibility of a negative
contagion when payment delays or liquidity sinks occur. In addition, if severe gridlock
takes place within the hub, it is conceivable that an adverse shock can be propagated
widely across the network. With this in mind, in the next section we quantitatively
examine the extent of payment recycling by running a simulation to measure the impact
of an exogenous shock.
167V. Payment Recycling
As shown in the previous section, the extent of payment recycling appears to vary
depending on the time of day. Consequently, even when assuming the same reaction
function for every participant, the pace of settlement for the system overall is also going
to vary by time of day.
Figure 6, the cumulative distribution of the intraday settlement (in value terms)
shown previously in Figure 2, makes it clear that more than 20 percent of that day’s
payment value is concentrated within the ﬁrst 10 minutes of the business day, from
9:00 to 9:10. The pace of settlement remains quite fast until 9:50, after which it starts
to gradually slow. In the afternoon, the settlement pattern reﬂects a response to the
settlements for ancillary DNS systems. As evident from the standard deviation, this
settlement pace is quite stable, showing very little deviation during the observed period.
One way to measure the impact of payment recycling on the full day’s settlement
activity for the system overall is to run a behavioral simulation, using certain assump-
tionsforparticipants’settlementbehavior.Oursimulationmakesthenaturalassumption
that when insufﬁcient funds are available to make a payment, the payment is delayed
until incoming payments increase the account balance sufﬁciently to enable settlement.
We also assume that when a participant faces a rise in intraday multilateral net debit
above a certain threshold at any time of day, that participant will exhibit more cau-
tious settlement behavior. The participant delays payments and then maintains a given
level of available funds to avoid a temporary liquidity shortage due to the possibility
Figure 6 Cumulative Distribution of Intraday Settlement
Note: The value of interbank funds transfers settled in December 2006. The solid line is the daily
average, and the dotted lines show the average plus or minus two standard deviations.
Source: Bank of Japan.
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of incoming payments from counterparties being delayed. To examine the extent to
which this cascading of settlement delays occurs when there is no constraint on pay-
ment delaying behavior, we examine the simulation without the repayment-ﬁrst and
one-hour rules.
We perform a stress test on interbank funds transfers assuming rule-based re-
actions shown above.
18 While simulation results are very dependent on the assumptions
we use for the behavior of participants, we do not aim to predict what will happen
under stress conditions, but rather to understand the complex interconnectedness of
a payment network.
Our assumptions of the participant behavior use upper bound liquidity, which we
deﬁne here as the minimum initial balance to enable a participant to pay the same

















































￿ is the time at the system closing. In this case, the upper bound liquidity for
that participant, UL










Thatistosay,theupper bound liquidityisequaltothemaximum amountofintraday
net debit with no delayed payments. This is each participant’s initial balance. Figure 7
gives an example of relationship between the net debit and the upper bound liquidity.
Participants start with their initial balances, and make an outgoing payment each
time a recorded settlement time arrives, as long as their balances are positive. Incoming
payments received are automatically added to the receivers’ balances. Under this con-
dition alone, all payments are settled without delay as smoothly as recorded. Payments
are delayed when adding a second condition, however, which is that when the level of
net debit rises above a certain threshold, the participants will delay making payments
because of the possibility of a temporary shortage of liquidity due to the slower pace
of incoming payments. In Figure 7, the payment begins to delay at point A where the
net debit is over the threshold. Participant
￿’s settlement delay may have an impact on
the next settlement of participant
￿, the counterparty expecting to receive
￿’s payment.
This recycling of receipt-driven payments could further impact participant
￿,a n di f
this impact is fed back to participant
￿ and results in unexpected delay in incoming
payments for
￿, the scheduled path starting from point A in Figure 7 would break down.
Consequently, payment-delaying behavior would be enhanced not only by the sec-
ond condition expressing concern for future shortages of liquidity, but also by the ﬁrst
condition of insufﬁcient balance for settlement when an initial delay is triggered by the
second condition. Because of the difﬁculty in understanding these complex forms of
18. Our simulation uses the Bank of Finland Payment System Simulator.
169Figure 7 Net Debit and Upper Bound Liquidity
Note: Net positive debit DL
￿
￿
￿ is plotted downward. The dotted line shows ﬂuctuations before
applying the max function.
interconnectedness, we assess the extent of system-wide settlement delays relative to
the actual pace of settlement in value terms.
We ﬁrst provide an overview of the payment data used in our simulation (Table 5).
Our simulation examines the occurrence of settlement delays, using the interbank funds
transfers settled on December 15, 2006, the last day of the reserve maintenance period.
A single payment has four data points: sender, receiver, payment amount, and time of
instruction issuance/settlement. A total of 4,400 transactions valued at ¥45 trillion were
settled. The distribution of value across participants, based on the average, median,
and top decile, is heavily skewed to the right. More than half of all participants had a
relatively lowvalue of both outgoing payments (below¥15.9 billion) andincoming pay-
ments (below ¥18.2 billion), and much of the large-value payments was concentrated
among a small number of participants. The largest sender, for example, accounted for
7.3 percent of the total value of all payments. The same tendency is evident with the
distribution of the upper bound liquidity across participants.
The results of the simulation in Figure 8 show for each stress scenario the devia-
tion in percentage points from the baseline cumulative percentage of settlement value
measured by real data. A scenario with no settlement delays (payments settled at the
same timing as the baseline) would follow the horizontal line passing through zero
on the vertical axis. The threshold values are set progressively smaller for scenarios
(1) through (4), with (1) at
￿
 
￿ of each participant’s upper bound liquidity, (2) at
￿
 
￿,( 3 )a t
￿
 
￿,a n d( 4 )a t
￿
 
￿. The smaller threshold, the more frequently settlement
delays occur.
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Table 5 Summary Statistics for Simulation Data
¥ billions
Outgoing payments Incoming payments Upper bound liquidity
Total 45,200.1 45,200.1 15,861.7
(4,469) (4,469)
Maximum 3,322.8 3,391.0 1,252.5
(370) (366)
Top decile 229.8 362.0 93.0
(20) (28)
Median 15.9 18.2 5.9
(3) (5)
Average 118.9 157.4 40.5
(12) (16)
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of transactions.
Figure 8 Stress Tests; Scenarios (1) to (4)
Note: The rate of deviation from the baseline (actual) cumulative percentage of settlement
value over time. The deviation rate at 17:00 is the percentage of that day’s payments
unsettled. The same is true for Figure 9.
The threshold levels are set at
￿
￿











Our results conﬁrm that delays become more pronounced as the threshold level
decreases. We also see that each scenario has its own peculiarities in regard to how
settlement delays increase over time. The level of deviation increases substantially for
all scenarios in the hour starting at 9:00, particularly immediately after the system
opening, but after that, the trends diverge. In scenarios (1) and (2), the deviation then
either ﬂattens out or shows a recovery of delay in some periods, while in scenario (3)
171it continues to show a moderate expansion of delay until 13:00, after which substantial
recovery is observed. In scenario (4), the deviation increases at the fastest pace, and
there is only a marginal recovery around 14:30, when there is DNS settling of foreign
exchange yen transactions, and 16:15, when there is DNS settling of domestic retail
credit transfers. This is attributed to the factors outlined below.
Settlement delays spread immediately and broadly in the morning, when the pay-
ment network has high density and high frequency of settlements. When participants
have initial balances to clear the maximum amount of intraday net debit, that is, the
upper bound liquidity, under the repayment-ﬁrst rule, only a little payment delay makes
it difﬁcult to execute the large volume and value of payments concentrated immediately
after system opening. For the hour starting at 9:00, settlement delays increase by at least
5percentagepointsforstressscenarios(1)and(2),wheresettlementconstraintscausing
the payment delay are smaller, and increase by 20 percentage points for scenario (3) and
30 percentage points for scenario (4), where those constraints are substantial.
In the afternoon, when the payment network is sparse, that is, it has relatively lower
density and frequency, settlement delays are less likely to have a direct impact on
subsequent payments. Except for stress scenario (4), additional delays are minor in
the afternoon. As noted above, this is attributed to the payments’ relative independence
from each other partly because most transactions and payments are related to the DNS
settlements. Stress scenarios (3) and (4) also conﬁrm that after the DNS settlements
are completed, surplus funds resulting from the settlements help recover the delay in
payments. Nevertheless, under scenario (4) nearly half of all payments are unsettled by
the system closing (the deviation rate at 17:00 in the graph is that day’s percentage of
unsettled payments). Scenario (3) shows some narrowing of delays toward the system
closing, but scenario (4) does not. The results suggest the possibility that the threshold
level, at which it becomes impossible for settlement delay contagion to autonomously
recover from the peak of delay, lies somewhere between the two scenarios.
Our simulation assumesa strictﬁrst-inﬁrst-out (FIFO)constraint, which means that
participants make payments in the order in which transactions were contracted. Under
the FIFO, payments are not executed even if there are queued payments that meet the
execution condition. These payments are not settled until the payments that come in
earlier are settled. Accordingly, under a bypass FIFO constraint, which is weaker than
strict FIFO and gives priority to payments that meet the execution condition, the degree
of settlement delay contagion is less than the results shown in Figure 8.
Next, we run a simulation by changing each participant’s threshold level accord-
ing to their position in the payment network. Speciﬁcally, under scenario (5), we set
a threshold to cause payment delay only for high-degree participants with at least 30
nodes linked and not for the others, while we do the opposite in scenario (6), not set-
ting a threshold for high-degree participants and setting them for the rest. We use the
same threshold level as in scenario (4),
￿
 
￿ of each participant’s upper bound liquidity.
High-degree participants account for only 10 percent of the total number of participants
but account for more than 45 percent of all payment value, and thus function as the
network hub.
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Figure 9 Stress Tests; Scenarios (4) to (6)
Note: A threshold level of
￿
￿
￿ of each participant’s upper bound liquidity is applied to all
participants in scenario (4), only to high-degree participants in scenario (5), and only to
low-degree participants (all but high-degree participants) in scenario (6).
The results of scenarios (4), (5), and (6) are shown in Figure 9. The differences
observed in the way that settlement delays spread immediately after the system opening
suggest the following hypotheses. The high-degree participants that act as a hub have
a large volume and value of outgoing payments, and thus the absolute value of their
intraday net debit tends to be large. Consequently, the upper bound liquidity corre-
sponding to maximum intraday net debit tends to be larger than the average value of
a single payment. In fact, participants often tap intraday credit to cover this amount
initially.
19 The constraints of funds balances and net debit position become less binding
on the settlement behavior of participants as the hub immediately after the system
opening. As payments from the hub proceed, so do payments system-wide because
of payment recycling. The opposite is true for low-degree participants. Because of the
low value of their upper bound liquidity, the constraints of funds balances and net debit
position tend to be more binding on their settlement behavior immediately after the
system opening when they make a relatively large-value payment. In fact, the ratio
of the threshold level (
￿
 
￿ of the upper bound liquidity) to the average value of a
single payment is a high 6.9 for high-degree participants, but only 0.6—below unity—
for low-degree participants.
20
19. When not withdrawn at the start, net debit is reduced through funding after 9:00.
20. Because low-degree participants do not need to raise a large amount of settlement funds, it follows that their
upper bound liquidity can be lower, implying that when necessary they have plenty of scope to access new
intraday credit or other sources of funding. We assume here no outside sources of additional funding even
under stress conditions, although a resort to outside funding is likely in the real world.
173Figure 10 High-Degree Participants’ Receipt-Driven Payments
Note: A threshold level of
￿
￿
￿ of each participant’s upper bound liquidity is applied to all
participants in scenario (4), only to high-degree participants in scenario (5), and only to
low-degree participants (all but high-degree participants) in scenario (6).
Finally, we check how the surplus funds held by high-degree participants could
alleviate the settlement delay in the entire system.
Receipt-driven payments by high-degree participants are shown in Figure 10 for
simulations (1) through (6). When planned settlement time
￿ arrives, if the balance of
























































































If the threshold is lowered from (1) to (3), the fraction of receipt-driven payments
increases, but if the threshold is changed from (3) to (4), the fraction of receipt-driven
payments declines substantially. The result suggests one possible reason why the mech-
anism to mitigate the contagion of settlement delay does not work well enough in
scenario (4) as in Figure 8. It seems that high-degree participants become unable to
make receipt-driven payments in scenario (4). Conversely, as in scenario (3), if the
contribution from receipt-driven payments is high, settlement delays can be largely
improved. To keep settlement delays to a minimum in FIFO settlement system, it is
important to settle large-value payments without any queuing at all. By deﬁnition, a
severe threshold level as in scenario (4) increases the contribution from receipt-driven
payments, but once the threshold exceeds a certain level, it becomes difﬁcult to execute
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large-value payments without signiﬁcant delay. Consequently, the contribution from
receipt-driven payments also declines.
VI. Conclusion
We investigated the intraday ﬂow of funds among participants in BOJ-NET using
large-scale records of payments.
Settlements in BOJ-NET under full-ﬂedged RTGS are intricately linked to a vari-
ety of systems, including the reserve requirements and the intraday overdraft facility.
They are also signiﬁcantly affected by market practices. These systems have built-in
mechanisms to prevent the spread of settlement delays caused by participants’ pay-
ment recycling, such as receipt-driven payments. One of them, the repayment-ﬁrst rule,
causes payments to agglomerate immediately after the system opening, and is not used
in the RTGS systems of the major economies other than Japan.
Time-heterogeneous intraday settlement activity causes the shape of the payment
network to vary through the day, which implies that the degree of payment recycling
also varies through the day. To understand the time-variable nature of the payment
network structure and its complex interconnectedness, we ran simulations under stress
conditions, and found the following: (1) during the time of the day when payment
recycling is active, particularly immediately after the system opening, it becomes easy
for settlement delays to spread widely, therefore resulting in the gridlock of funds ﬂow;
and (2) participants functioning as the hub of the payment network are able, owing
in part to their relatively high level of liquidity, to absorb and limit the contagion of
settlement delays.
Acceptance of some settlement delays may also have the effect of moderating the
funding pressure in the morning and stabilizing the money market rates. Behind the
merit, it may accompany the repercussion that it could enlarge intraday unsettled ex-
posure due to settlement delay. There are a number of conceivable ways to deal with
the trade-off between stabilizing the intraday developments in the interest rates and
minimizing intraday exposures.
One is to exogenously reform the shape of the payment network by either selecting
or tiering participants. As a matter of course, it is difﬁcult to ap r i o r ispecify the de-
sirable network structure. Even if this could be done, it would be difﬁcult to determine
whether such a network shape were desirable from a social welfare perspective in terms
of efﬁciency, safety, and convenience. Nevertheless, it is meaningful to examine a de-
sirable payment network with consideration on positive and negative sides of payment
recycling. For example, it may be possible to achieve a more efﬁcient ﬂow of intraday
funds by further concentrating payments into participants functioning as the hub. This
may hold down intraday exposures while stabilizing the intraday ﬂuctuations in the
interest rates caused by the demand for settlement funds.
Possibly a more realistic action would be to implement a supplementary facility
to improve the trade-off. For example, the liquidity-saving features with offsetting
mechanism implemented within BOJ-NET RTGS in 2008 are attempts to efﬁciently
175use the system liquidity while simultaneously achieving early settlement.
21 With these
liquidity-saving features, payments that meet certain conditions would be settled even
under settlement gridlock, making it possible to hold down participants’ upper bound
liquidity. This in turn would alleviate the early-morning upward pressure on the interest
rates caused by the demand for settlement funds, while maintaining the same settlement
pace as under RTGS with the repayment-ﬁrst rule and the one-hour rule.
APPENDIX: BOJ-NET FUNDS TRANSFERS
Excluding a large decline caused by conversion to full-ﬂedged RTGS in 2001, the daily
averagevaluesettledunderBOJ-NEThasfollowedamoderategrowth path,instepwith
the increase in settlements of Japanese government securities (JGS) repos and other
transactions (Appendix Figure 1). Average annualized growth was 6 percent from 2001,
when daily settlements averaged ¥77 trillion, to 2006, when they averaged ¥102 trillion.
The level of liquidity available for settlements ﬂuctuated widely during this period. The
intraday overdraft facility, which was introduced with the conversion to RTGS, made
Appendix Figure 1 BOJ-NET Funds Transfers, Current Account Balances, and
Intraday Overdrafts
Note: Settlement value is the monthly average value settled under BOJ-NET, the current
account balance is the average balance during the reserve maintenance period, and the
intraday overdraft is the monthly average of daily peak amount used.
Source: Bank of Japan.
21. The next-generation RTGS project is built on two steps: (1) introducing liquidity-saving features to BOJ-NET
RTGS; and (2) incorporating large-value payments currently handled by two private-sector DNS systems (the
foreign exchange yen clearing system and the domestic retail credit transfer system) into the new RTGS with
liquidity-saving features (Bank of Japan [2006]).
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Appendix Figure 2 BOJ-NET Funds Transfers by Type of Transaction
Note: Interbank funds transfers are primarily for the settlement of call money transactions,
JGS DVP is the cash legs of DVP for JGSs, and others include the cash legs of DVP for
non-JGSs, the ﬁnal settlement of net positions, and the settlement of transactions with
the BOJ.
Source: Bank of Japan.
about ¥10–20 trillion of intraday liquidity available for RTGS. In addition, the level of
balances kept in current accounts held at the BOJ was stepped up in accordance with the
quantitative monetary easing policy, temporarily climbing above ¥30 trillion. Because
current account balances declined sharply after the end of the quantitative easing, the
¥115 trillion of payments was settled with intraday overdrafts of ¥21 trillion and current
account balances of ¥9 trillion at the end of 2006.
The value settled under BOJ-NET can be broadly categorized as interbank funds
transfers, mostly call loans, the cash legs of securities settlements including JGS
delivery-versus-payment (DVP), some DNSs of net positions including the domestic
retail credit transfers, and transactions between participants and the BOJ (Bank of
Japan [2007b]). The interbank funds transfers accounted for roughly one-third of all
payments settled through BOJ-NET at the end of 2006, and thus are important for their
overall size as well as because they represent the call money transactions for the ﬁnal
leg of funding transactions.
The conversion to RTGS was accompanied by a substantial decline in the interbank
funds transfers, as evident from data showing the breakdown of BOJ-NET funds trans-
fers (Appendix Figure 2). Prior to the introduction of BOJ-NET in 1988, participating
ﬁnancial institutions were in the practice of consolidating multiple payments to and
from tanshi companies (money market brokers), and drawing a single check to present
to the BOJ, to avoid the operational hassle of presenting a check to the BOJ for every
177transaction. Partly out of a reluctance to change, settlements of the transactions through
tanshi companies’ broking in BOJ-NET prior to the conversion to RTGS were done
in two stages, passing through tanshi companies’ current account with the BOJ, with
the funds passing from the lender of funds to the tanshi companies and then to the
borrower of funds. This system made the settlement value in BOJ-NET double the
value of transactions. At the conversion to RTGS in 2001, direct settlement between
the lender and borrower with bypass of the tanshi companies was introduced, which
essentially cut the value of funds transfers in half.
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